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Abstract 
This study examines what types of perceived risks influence consumers’ and non-consumers’ willingness 
to pay for ride-sharing services as a representative of the sharing economy. Choice experiment models are 
constructed to capture consumers’ and non-consumers’ perceptions of the relative importance of each 
service attribute reducing perceived risk. Results show individuals’ utility significantly increases when the 
service does not require private information from consumers, provides a driver-tracking system, requires 
a commercial driver’s license from drivers, offers a driver-review system, comprehensively compensates 
for negative incidents, and guarantees a minimum wage and benefit plan for drivers. This research 
contributes to a deeper understanding of the role of perceived risk in the sharing economy, and suggests 
theoretical and practical implications that can assist companies and policy makers.  
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Introduction 
Sharing has existed in human communal living for a long time before the economy started to rely on 
monetary transactions. Recently, what is now called the “sharing economy” has entered a new phase. Web 
2.0 developments and the commercialization of smartphones have helped foster businesses that allow 
mobile consumers to personally share and trade idle resources including natural, human, and capital 
resources at a low search cost based on digital platforms 1 . These third-party peer-to-peer online 
marketplaces where individuals trade their own goods and services or accesses to goods and services, and 
pay a fee to intermediaries (Sundararajan, 2013) without an employment contract is often referred to as 
the sharing economy, or sometimes called the peer economy, collaborative consumption, platform 
economy, or on-demand economy, access economy (e.g, Botsman, 2013; Weber, 2014). 
The sharing economy as a new business model is playing a significant role in expanding consumers’ 
choices and tens of millions of people worldwide consider it an alternative means of existing services. 
Notwithstanding its popularity mainly due to economic benefits and convenience, many individuals are 
still indifferent or reluctant to use such services (Ballús-Armet, Shaheen, Clonts, and Weinzimmer, 2014; 
PricewaterhourseCoopers, 2014). This was primarily due to three reasons: a lack of connectivity, a lack of 
awareness, and perceived risks, the main focus of this study. Perceived risks associated with several 
aspects of sharing economy services--concerns about personal information entered for transactions, 
flexible qualifications of service providers, a lack of comprehensive accident compensation process, and a 
lack of fairness in resource allocation are mainly related to perceived risks in this new segment of 
economy. 
                                                             
1 In the field of IS, the term “platform” has been used to refer to organizational capability platforms, product family platforms, market intermediary 
platforms, or technology system platforms (Thomas, Autio, and Gann, 2011). Note that this study uses the term as market intermediary platforms as the 
term in the work of Economides and Katsamakas (2006). 
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Although these types of negative perceptions of the sharing economy hinder its growth by influencing the 
choices of both consumers and non-consumers, little is known about what kind of concerns affect 
participation in the sharing economy and how the value of reducing concerns can be assessed. To fill the 
gap in the literature, this study proposes four main perceived risks influencing consumers’ and non-
consumers’ preferences for service features reducing perceived risk, and measures the willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for the features by using discrete choice modeling. This approach allows for the estimation of the 
relative importance of service features for consumption decisions. If intermediaries provide a service 
feature to reduce perceived risk, consumers’ WTP for the service increases due to the increased WTP for 
the service feature. Empirical data was obtained by Qualtrics panels (https://www.qualtrics.com). 
Qualtrics data is known for better generalizability to the population at large because Qualtrics uses by-
invitation-only online panel recruitment to avoid self-selection and professional survey takers (Hagtvedt, 
2011). 
This study concentrates on ride-sharing services, one of the fastest growing and largest segments of the 
sharing economy, as well as the sector for which there has been considerable discussion of private and 
public concerns (Feeney, 2015). Consumers of a ride-sharing service have had opportunities to experience 
multiple types of perceived risks, and compare the properties of this type of service with a traditional taxi 
service. Moreover, these risks, in different ways, can also be sensed in other types of sharing economy 
services such as Airbnb or Taskrabbit.  
Perceived risks are different from their actual risks. Since individuals hardly possess sufficient resources 
including time and skills, and strong motivations for estimating risks in most cases, what affects 
individuals’ decision processes is perceived risks (Garbarnio and Strahilevitz, 2004). As a first study to 
encompass perceived barriers including private and public concerns which keep non-consumers from 
choosing ride-sharing services, this study describes major features of ride-sharing services pertaining to 
four types of perceived risks. Theoretical and empirical contributions are discussed in the conclusion 
section.  
Theoretical framework 
Prior studies of perceived risk  
Perceived risk has played a significant role in service purchase behavior and technology acceptance 
research since its introduction by Bauer’s work in 1960. Types of perceived risk that were investigated 
have increased as the type and complexity of transactions increases. In the early stage, the perceived risk 
theory focused on perceived risk in physical services. Garner (1986) described social2, financial, physical, 
performance, time, and psychological risk as perceived risk for services in general, and inspired many 
studies on perceived risk. As electronic commerce emerged and became prevalent, the focus was extended 
to online consumer decisions. Bhatnagar, Misra, and Rao (2000) identified three dominant perceived 
risks in Web shopping: product risk, financial risk, and information risk. Perceived risk was also 
examined as a factor in acceptance of various technology. Lee (2009) integrated the technology 
acceptance model and theory of planned behavior using financial, security/privacy, performance, social, 
and time risk and perceived benefits of online banking.  
The use of sharing economy services involves both consumer purchase decisions and acceptance of 
innovative information technology. In addition to perceived risks examined in previous research (Ho and 
Victor, 1994), sharing economy service consumers face undesirable effects of the service on society. Prior 
research of perceived risk has focused on personal rather than social concerns although numerous studies 
indicate consumers’ purchase decisions are affected by fairness concerns (Brown, 2000). In this light, this 
study attempts to integrate and re-categorize previously examined perceived risks related to the sharing 
economy, and incorporate a new dimension of perceived risk which has not been fully investigated.  
                                                             
2 Social risk in prior studies is defined as potential loss of status in one’s social group as a result of adopting a product or service, looking foolish or 
untrendy (Featherman and Pavlou, 2003). This risk is not related to social concerns about fairness in resource allocation and profit distribution, which 
is referred to as fairness risk in this study.  
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Deterrents of participating in the sharing economy 
Whereas the motivational factors for participation (Hamari, Sjoklint, and Ukkonen, 2015), legal problems 
(Koopman, Mitchell, and Thierer, 2015), its potential application plans (Dillahunt and Malone, 2015) are 
increasingly understood, there is only limited research that would shed light on the reasons for not using 
sharing economy services. Gerber and Hui (2013) identify distrust of project creators’ use of funds as 
deterrents for participation as supporters in crowdfunding. Tussyadiah (2015) finds lack of trust, lack of 
efficacy, and lack of economic benefits deter the use of peer-to-peer accommodation rental services. Based 
on a survey of Uber users, Ballús-Armet et al. (2014) reveal liability and trust concerns are critical barriers 
to participation in peer-to-peer car-sharing. Lee, Chan, Balaji, and Chong (2016) propose a benefit-cost 
framework to explain both motivators (enjoyment and economic reward) and deterrents (privacy and 
security risk) for participation in the sharing economy. However, earlier studies pay little attention to 
broader concerns which cause consumers to not participate in sharing economy services.  
Perceived risk in the sharing economy 
Consumers are exposed to perceived risk related to several aspects of sharing economy services. This 
study proposes the following four types of perceived risk identified through literature review: perceived 
privacy risk, perceived performance risk, perceived conflict risk, and perceived fairness risk. Inspired by 
Tiwana, Konsynski, and Bush (2010)’s framework for studying platform evolution, I categorized perceived 
risk (e.g., social, financial, physical, performance, time, and psychological risk) proposed in prior studies 
for consumer behavior and technology acceptance according to the main factor causing perceived risk. 
The first two perceived risks involve concerns regarding the internal performance of the sharing economy 
service, and the second two perceived risks involve concerns regarding the external environment, 
encompassing aspects such as conflict resolution processes and economic impacts of the sharing economy 
on society. Definitions of perceived risk are summarized in Table 1 with corresponding key attributes of 
ride-sharing services. 
First, perceived privacy risk is relevant to concerns about intentional misuse of private information such 
as name, phone number, credit card information, and geolocation data generally required for using 
sharing economy services. Personal information may be wrongfully managed or illegally hacked, causing 
financial, physical, or reputational damages to consumers (Featherman and Pavlou, 2003). Second, 
perceived performance risk can be derived from distrust of service providers because the qualification 
requirements of service providers are less stringent to encourage their participation and enlarge the pool 
for matching supply and demand, as one of the benefits of sharing economy characteristics (Botsman, 
2013). Third, perceived conflict risk is related to comprehensiveness of compensation for incidents which 
can occur while using the service. Consumers may be concerned about a lack of regulations promising 
comprehensive compensation in case of financial damages or time loss (Lee et al., 2016). Finally, 
consumers’ decisions can be also influenced by perceived risk which involves the dynamism of markets 
violating one’s belief or principles for distributive justice. Distributive justice is achieved from a fairness-
conscious consumers’ perspective when service consumers are satisfied with the outcome of resource 
allocation or profit distribution between intermediaries and service providers of the sharing economy 
(Smith, Bolton, and Wagner, 1999), similar to the concept of Fair Trade. Even if the outcome does not 
cause any financial or time loss directly to consumers in the short term, consumers tend to choose 
services which can bring fair outcomes between intermediaries and stakeholders.  
To measure the value of reducing perceived risks and compare the relative importance of different types 
of perceived risks, the following six key features of a ride-sharing service were chosen through a thorough 
literature review and interviews with consumers, non-consumers, and an expert: Privacy, License, 
Review, Tracking, Conflict, and Fairness. Considering survey participants’ limited capacity to compare 
various combination of features, this study chose six most frequently recurring features from the 
literature and interviews. 
Origin Attributes 
Primarily related 
perceived risk 
Description-Definition of  
perceived risk 
Internal 
environ-
ment 
Requiring private information from 
consumers (Privacy) 
Privacy risk 
The possibility of consumers’ personal information being 
misused 
Commercial taxi driver's license Performance risk The possibility of products or services not delivering the 
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(License) advertised and expected benefits 
Driver-rating system (Review) 
Driver-tracking system (Tracking) 
External 
environ-
ment 
Proper accident compensation 
(Conflict)  
Conflict risk 
The possibility of conflicts between firms and consumers 
not being properly resolved from a consumer perspective 
Minimum wage and benefit plan for 
drivers (Fairness) 
Fairness risk 
The possibility of resources and profits not being fairly 
allocated or distributed between firms and stakeholders 
Table 1. Summary of attributes and related perceived risk 
First, with regard to perceived privacy risk, the feature of requiring private information from consumers 
was chosen because one way to fundamentally block information misuse is not to provide personal 
information. When consumers have to enter their private information, concerns about consumer 
information management or protection may increase perceived privacy risk and decrease the WTP for the 
service. Second, three features, License, Review, and Tracking, were selected as features reducing 
perceived performance risk: licensed drivers can lower consumers’ perceived performance risk because 
they are more likely to be trained and serious drivers; a driver-rating system can reduce perceived 
performance risk if consumers can find it before a ride; and a tracking system enabling consumers to 
identify drivers’ location around them and know when they will arrive can decrease perceived 
performance risk. Since a taxi driver’s license and driver-rating system could provide information about 
drivers’ general performance, these two features are expected to a substitute of each other. Third, in terms 
of conflict risk, whether the service provides proper conflict resolution processes is chosen to be 
examined. Since the pace of legislation is typically slower than the speed with which various disputes 
associated with the new business models of the sharing economy arise, consumers may have a higher level 
of perceived conflict risk compared to other services which have existed for a long time. Lastly, working 
conditions for drivers was included because of its influence on perceived fairness risk. Perceived fairness 
risk can be sensed basically due to the new structures of the sharing economy labor markets. Sharing 
economy platforms generally treat service providers as independent contractors, not as employees. As fair 
trade products are preferred by many consumers, fairness-conscious consumers may not want their 
service choice to contribute to worsening workers’ long-term working conditions such as no guaranteed 
minimum wage, and a lack of health and retirement benefits. Thus, I develop the following hypotheses 
(see Table 2): that requiring private information from consumers is negatively associated with the WTP 
for ride-sharing services; all the other aforementioned features are expected to be positively associated 
with the WTP for ride-sharing services; and a commercial driver’s license and rating system about 
individual drivers are substitutable to some extent.  
Method and Data 
Method 
This study employs a choice experiment (CE) to analyze consumers’ risk perception for service attributes 
by calculating the WTP for each attribute (Train, 2003). The CE is rooted in Lancastrian consumer theory 
(Lancaster, 1966) and random utility theory (McFadden, 1974). The Lancastrian approach to consumer 
theory assumes that utility is derived from the characteristics of goods rather than from the goods 
themselves. Models based on random utility theory assume that decision makers choose one of the 
mutually exclusive alternatives, which provides the highest utility in their choice set.  
The CE enables researchers to estimate the WTP for product or service attributes that are not directly 
traded in markets because the estimation does not require survey participants to answer the WTP for each 
attribute directly. To measure risk perception in terms of monetary values is beneficial because attributes 
that influence the WTP for ride-sharing services are not traded individually, and for respondents, judging 
the WTP for each attribute separated from each other attribute is not straightforward.  
Individual n’s utility associated with the choice of an alternative i from a finite set of J alternatives 
included in choice set Cnt in situation t can be written as in equation (1).  
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=  +             (1) 
where   is a deterministic component of utility and   is a Gumbel-distributed random error 
component. The Gumbel distribution is characterized by the scale parameter   and the variance of 
Var( ) =  (	/6). When   >  	for	all j≠i, alternative i is chosen by consumer n. Thus, the 
probability that a consumer selects alternative i can be described as: 
  = P( > ; ∀j∈ , ∀ j≠i)        (2) 
Unlike the traditional conditional logit model, a random parameter logit (RPL) allows heterogeneity as a 
continuous function of the random parameters underlying the distribution of the surveyed population. 
Using RPL, heterogeneity in preferences is estimated since individuals’ preferences for service features 
are not assumed homogeneous. Thus, equation (1) can be re-written as:  
 =  + ′ +          (3) 
  is a price or cost variable, and  is a vector of other non-price attributes.  is assumed to be a 
constant parameter and  is assumed to be a vector of normally distributed random parameters that are 
consumer specific, relying on the central limit theorem. Due to the ordinal property of the utility function, 
individual behavior is not affected when dividing equation (3) by the scale parameter , and equation (4) 
becomes scale-free with the constant variance of , after the division. 
 = (/) + (/)′  +         (4) 
Equation (4) can be simplified as: 
 =  ′! +	          (4′) 
  is a vector of parameters corresponding to the vector of attributes ! including a price or cost variable 
so that the probability of selecting alternative i from choice set  is represented by 
 = "[exp( ′!) /∑ exp( ′!)] +( ),       (5) 
where +( ) is the distribution of the random parameters (Train, 2003).  
Given utility’s non-cardinal nature, utility coefficients are usually transformed into more meaningful WTP 
values or implicit prices for each of the attributes. Traditionally, WTP is simply calculated as the ratio of 
the coefficient on marginal utility of an attribute to the price coefficient, which is typically assumed to be 
nonrandom. However, directly specifying the distribution of WTP allows a variation in a price variable 
(Ortega, Wang, Wu, and Olynk, 2011), and a consumer n’s utility can be written as:  
 = - + (-.)′  +            (6) 
where the utility coefficients are parameterized as -= (/) and . = (/−). The estimated price 
coefficient -	 is assumed to follow a truncated triangular distribution spanning negative values, 
considering positive values of price and reducing a step for calculation of the WTP. . (the vector WTP 
coefficients) is assumed to be normally distributed, relying on the central limit theorem. By estimating 
., the WTP for each feature can be estimated and compared. Alternatively, a latent class approach can 
be used when heterogeneity in parameters is assumed. A latent class logit model (LCM) allows for the 
sorting of heterogeneous respondents into a number of S distinct latent classes composed of 
homogeneous individuals (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). The probability of selecting i given choice 
situation t takes the form of  
 = [∑ exp( 0′!)/∑ exp( 0′!)1234 ]52       (7) 
where  0 is the specific parameter vector for class s, and 52 is the probability of individual n falling into 
class s. 52 can be modelled as  
52 = exp(62′7) /∑ exp(68′7)8          (8) 
where 62 is the parameter vector for members in class s and 7 is a set of characteristics that influence 
individual n in the class. 
 
Experiment design 
Seven features of ride-sharing service, their levels, and corresponding hypotheses are described in Table 
2. Fare for three miles as an average distance of a trip was also added in the experiment to estimate the 
WTP for comparison. A full factorial experimental design which includes all possible combinations of the 
seven attributes and with two alternatives to choose between would require the use of (5×2×2×2×2×2×2)2 
choice sets. Because of this practically infeasible number of choice sets, I use a fractional factorial design 
through the OPTEX procedure in SAS 9.3. Sixteen choice scenarios and a D-optimal design that allowed 
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for the estimation of all main and two-way interaction effects are chosen (see an example choice set in 
Figure 1). I incorporate 16 simulated ride-sharing service selecting scenarios into a survey where I 
collected data on consumers’ socio-economic demographics, commuting habits, and risk perceptions. The 
hypotheses are proposed based on the assumption that perceived risk decreases consumers’ and non-
consumers’ utility.  
Table 2. Attributes and hypotheses 
  
Figure 1. An example choice set 
Participants face travelling decision making scenarios between hypothetical service options composed of 
different attribute combinations. 400 valid surveys yielded a statistical sample of 19,200 individual 
observations (400 observations with 16 choice sets and 3 choices). To control for other factors that may 
influence the level of perceived risk, a hypothetical scenario is assumed and stated to participants. The 
Service Attribute 
Attribute 
Levels 
Descriptions Hypotheses (Test result) 
Fare for 3 miles 
($; including 
tips; Fare) 
7, 9, 12, 
15, 17 
  
Requiring private 
information 
(Privacy) 
Yes 
A passenger has to download an app, and enter 
personal information including credit card 
information to use services 
H1:  Requiring private information from consumers 
is negatively associated with the utility of the 
service. (Supported for non-consumer group only) 
No 
No need to download or provide any personal 
information to platform providers 
Commercial taxi 
driver's license 
(License) 
Yes 
A driver who obtained a commercial taxi driver’s 
license provides the service  
H2a: Requiring a 
commercial taxi driver’s 
license is positively 
associated with the utility 
of the service. (Supported) 
H2d: A commercial 
taxi driver’s license as 
a driver’s requirement 
and the availability of a 
rating system about 
individual drivers are 
complements for each 
other.  
(Supported for non-
consumer group only) 
No 
A driver who does not have a commercial taxi 
driver’s license provides the service  
Driver-rating 
system (Review) 
Yes 
A passenger can check an individual driver's and 
application's rating before rides. Only highly 
rated drivers can drive and the application is 
being highly rated by large number of consumers 
H2b:  Availability of a 
rating system about 
individual drivers is 
positively associated with 
the utility of the service.
(Supported) No A rating system is not available 
Driver-tracking 
system 
(Tracking) 
Yes 
A passenger can track a driver' location and know 
when the driver will come  
H2c:  Availability of a driver-tracking system is 
positively associated with the utility of the service.
(Supported) No No tracking system  
Proper accident 
compensation 
(Conflict) 
Yes Any accidents will be properly compensated H3: An improper compensation process is 
negatively associated with the utility of the service.
(Supported) No 
Some accidents may not be properly 
compensated 
Minimum wage 
and benefit plan 
for drivers 
(Fairness) 
Yes 
The service company guarantees minimum wage 
and sponsors a benefit plan such as health 
insurance and retirement for drivers 
H4: Guaranteeing a minimum wage and sponsoring 
a benefit plan for drivers are negatively associated 
with the utility of the service. (Supported) 
 
No 
The service company does not contribute to 
minimum wage and a benefit plan for drivers 
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statement describes that the service application was downloaded more than 1 million times by other 
consumers to consider the “critical-mass” phenomenon on service usage and to reflect a reality in which 
adopting ride-sharing service is pervasive. I also assume a situation where vehicles are the same.   
Data 
This study analyzes 6,382 choice sets with 19,146 options obtained from 400 survey participants. 
Participants were recruited through Qualtrics online survey panels in February 2017. 18 choice sets were 
excluded because of missing values. Samples are limited to people who currently live or work in six large 
cities, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Boston, and Washington D.C. where the six largest 
number of Uber drivers are active. 
Variable Consumers Non-consumers Total 
Number of participants  251   149   400  
Number of observations  4,000   2,382   6,382  
Age (mean) 39.55 50.42 43.60 
Female (%) 65.34 69.13 66.75 
Education (%) 
Primary 1.59 8.05 4.00 
Secondary 36.65 49.66 41.50 
Associate 24.70 26.17 25.25 
Undergraduate 23.11 5.37 16.50 
Graduate/professional 13.55 9.40 12.00 
Other 0.40 1.34 0.75 
Household annual income (%) 
< 15,000 5.98 8.05 6.50 
15,000-25,000 8.37 11.41 9.50 
25,000-50,000 21.51 30.20 24.75 
50,000-75,000 29.48 28.86 29.25 
75,000-100,000 11.55 10.07 11.00 
100,000-125,000 6.37 1.34 4.50 
125,000-150,000 4.38 3.36 4.00 
>150,000 12.35 6.71 10.25 
Frequency of taxi/ride-sharing service use (%) 
< 5 Times/Year 10.36 58.39 28.25 
5-11 Times/Year 11.16 12.75 11.75 
1-2 Times/Month 21.12 13.42 18.25 
3-4 Times/Month 32.67 6.71 23.00 
> Once/Week 24.70 8.72 18.75 
Table 3. Socio-demographic statistics 
Results 
Table 4 contains the estimated coefficients from the RPL models. Overall, both consumers and non-
consumers consider a tracking system, a commercial drivers’ license, the availability of a driver review 
system, proper accident compensation, and drivers’ fair working conditions to be valuable. However, the 
need to make personal information available to the intermediary does not significantly influence the 
consumer group. The insignificant coefficient on the interaction term shows a commercial taxi driver’s 
license and driver review system are not significantly substitutable nor complementary to each other for 
both consumers and non-consumers.  
Variable       Consumers                            Non-consumers                        Total sample 
Fare -0.182 *** (0.012) -0.117*** (0.016) -0.151*** (0.009) 
Privacy -0.018 
 
(0.035) 0.424*** (0.065) 0.143*** (0.034) 
Tracking 0.536 *** (0.043) 0.365*** (0.048) 0.455*** (0.031) 
License 0.356 *** (0.050) 0.425*** (0.078) 0.409*** (0.042) 
Review 0.298 *** (0.045) 0.442*** (0.067) 0.329*** (0.036) 
Conflict 0.235 *** (0.034) 0.436*** (0.057) 0.292*** (0.030) 
Fairness 0.434 *** (0.036) 0.312*** (0.051) 0.369*** (0.029) 
License × Review 0.042 
 
(0.065) -0.075
 
(0.110) 0.026
 
(0.056) 
Opt Out -2.992 *** (0.148) -1.532*** (0.183) -2.342*** (0.112) 
STDEV(Privacy) 0.255 *** (0.060) 0.629*** (0.073) 0.449*** (0.041) 
STDEV(Tracking) 0.453 *** (0.049) 0.211*** (0.077) 0.326*** (0.042) 
STDEV(License) 0.331 *** (0.054) 0.506*** (0.070) 0.383*** (0.046) 
STDEV(Review) 0.279 *** (0.060) 0.342*** (0.078) 0.259*** (0.053) 
STDEV(Conflict) 0.258 *** (0.057) 0.454*** (0.070) 0.348*** (0.040) 
STDEV(Fairness) 0.285 *** (0.054) 0.354*** (0.065) 0.292*** (0.039) 
N 251      149            400    
Log-likelihood -3323 
  
-1896
  
-5439
 
Adj.pseudo R-squared 0.241 
  
0.240
  
0.208
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AIC/N 1.690      1.709      1.753    
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Parameters 
were estimated using NLOGIT 6. 
Table 4. Parameter estimates from Random Parameters Models 
The significance of the standard deviation of features in Table 4 implies significant group heterogeneity 
which can be identified in the LCM. Table 5 presents that the probability that a randomly selected 
consumer belongs to Class 1a, 1b, or 1c is 68%, 11%, 21%, respectively. The probability that a randomly 
selected non-consumer belongs to Class 2a, 2b, or 2c is 42%, 29%, 28%, respectively. All consumer groups 
show significant coefficients for Fare, which implies that consumer groups are sensitive to fare. Class 1a 
generally regards all key attributes as valuable except Privacy. Class 1b puts a high value on not providing 
their private information compared to the other two consumer groups. For Class 1b, while a commercial 
driver’s license and a rating system of drivers do not significantly influence consumers’ utility when 
provided alone, they increase consumers’ utility when provided with each other; these two features are 
complements to each other (significant positive value on the interaction terms). Class 1b shows a 
relatively high Conflict coefficient value relative to the coefficients on the other features, meaning 
comprehensive compensation processes are important to this group. Class 1c presents a relatively low 
price coefficient in absolute value relative to the coefficient values on the other features; however, their 
values on Tracking and Review are relatively high, and surprisingly, their utility decreases when they do 
not provide their private information. These values imply Class 1c appreciates the distinctive features of 
ride-sharing services more than consumers in the other groups. A tracking system is one distinctive 
benefit of ride-sharing services, and a rating system for drivers is a major tool to reduce perceived risk. 
Class 1c seems to understand the advantages of providing private information such that by entering their 
credit card information, they can utilize a more convenient payment system without cash and by 
providing their personal information, they may think they can contribute to construct a credible system 
from both service consumers and providers’ sides.   
Class 2a shows generally significant coefficients on features similar to Class 1a, but considers not 
providing private information to the service company valuable. Class 2a places the highest value on 
License. The significant negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates License and Review features 
are substitutable to some extent in this class. Non-consumers’ choices in Class 2b are significantly 
influenced by features of performance risk (Tracking, License, Review), conflict risk (Conflict), and 
fairness risk (Fairness). Class 2c is differentiated from other classes in terms of their privacy sensitivity. 
Their utility is significantly increased when the service does not require to download an app or enter their 
personal information. All six classes exhibit statistical significance for the Conflict and Fairness 
coefficients. 
Variable 
Consumers Non-consumers 
Class 1a Class 1b Class 1c Class 2a Class 2b Class 2c 
Fare -0.292 *** (0.020) -0.332*** (0.059) -0.058** (0.026) -0.276 *** (0.061) 0.023 (0.031) -0.193*** (0.040) 
Privacy -0.027 (0.039) 0.566*** (0.126) -0.125* (0.065) 0.410 *** (0.107) 0.089 (0.082) 0.809*** (0.118) 
Tracking 0.453 *** (0.040) 0.562*** (0.136) 0.789*** (0.078) 0.322 *** (0.070) 0.487*** (0.081) 0.136 (0.109) 
License 0.396 *** (0.051) -0.363 (0.198) 0.403*** (0.126) 0.517 *** (0.091) 0.390*** (0.142) 0.202 (0.176) 
Review 0.354 *** (0.050) -0.134 (0.161) 0.699*** (0.123) 0.472 *** (0.091) 0.649*** (0.143) 0.217 (0.158) 
Conflict 0.214 *** (0.038) 0.531*** (0.132) 0.325*** (0.070) 0.396 *** (0.071) 0.486*** (0.083) 0.497*** (0.104) 
Fairness 0.486 *** (0.038) 0.449*** (0.133) 0.417*** (0.069) 0.385 *** (0.065) 0.300*** (0.094) 0.333*** (0.103) 
License × Review -0.063 (0.062) 0.602** (0.239) 0.008 (0.146) -0.259 ** (0.119) 0.242 (0.167) 0.312 (0.207) 
Opt Out -6.664 *** (0.329) -1.347** (0.587) -0.274 (0.318) -7.391 *** (1.137) 0.263 (0.372) 0.068 (0.438) 
Class prob. 0.679     0.107    0.214    0.423     0.293    0.284    
N 251        149        
Log-likelihood -2929        -1693        
Adj.pseudo R-
squared 
0.331        0.321        
AIC/N 1.485                 1.518                 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Parameters 
were estimated using NLOGIT 6. 
Table 5. Parameter estimates from Latent Class Models 
Table 6 shows the WTP for each service feature. The WTP for Privacy, License, Review, and Conflict in 
the non-consumer group is higher compared to the consumer group. In particular, the WTP for License 
($3.01) and Conflict ($2.80) is much higher in the non-consumer group, meaning that non-consumers 
demand a higher qualification and a more comprehensive compensation process for accidents than 
consumers. Non-consumers show the highest WTP for License, and consumers show the highest WTP for 
Tracking. The WTP for Privacy is not statistically significant in the consumer group. The hypothesis test 
results are summarized in Table 2. The test result of H2d indicates that an increase in non-consumers’ 
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WTP for the service caused by one of two features is positively affected by the availability of the other 
feature.  
Variable                 Consumers                             Non-consumers                         Total sample 
Privacy 0.12
 
[-0.10, 0.34] 1.51*** [2.05, 0.96] 0.51*** [0.33, 0.70] 
Tracking 2.35*** [2.03, 1.91] 1.29*** [3.70, 0.93] 1.85*** [1.64, 2.07] 
License 1.53*** [1.15, 1.89] 3.01*** [3.26, 2.33] 1.75*** [1.43, 2.07] 
Review 1.54*** [1.20, 1.22] 2.62*** [3.27, 1.97] 1.79*** [1.51, 1.56] 
Conflict 0.97*** [0.72, 2.09] 2.80*** [1.85, 2.33] 1.40*** [1.24, 1.72] 
Fairness 1.80*** [1.50, 0.34] 1.50*** [2.05, 1.14] 1.53*** [1.34, 0.70] 
License × Review 0.21 [-0.68, 0.26] -1.18*** [-1.90,-0.47]  0.19 [-0.67, 0.07] 
N 251      149      400    
Log-likelihood -3323
  
-1896
  
-4882
 
Adj.pseudo R-squared 0.241
  
0.240
  
0.289
 
AIC/N 1.690      1.709      1.567    
Table 6. Willingness-to-pay, mean [95% confidence interval] 
Conclusion  
This study contributes to a deeper understanding of consumers’ choice in an innovative segment of the 
economy, the sharing economy. This study examines the role of perceived risk in the acceptance of ride-
sharing. In order to assess perceived risk, this study estimates the WTP for service attributes reducing 
perceived risks. The following findings are added to the existing literature: a) both consumers and non-
consumers consider service providers’ working conditions as much as the other attributes which offer 
more direct benefits to consumers; b) the influence of requiring downloading an app and entering private 
information including credit card information on a majority of consumers and some non-consumers’ ride-
sharing service purchase decisions is not significant; c) non-consumers tend to have the higher WTP for a 
commercial drivers’ license and comprehensive conflict resolution process than consumers; and d) a 
majority of consumers and non-consumers prefer distinctive technical benefits (e.g., Tracking) which 
originated from the sharing economy service sector, and a rating system (e.g., Review) to decrease 
perceived risk and secure mutual trust considering the purchase process of the sharing economy.  
This study extends the theory of perceived risk in technology acceptance by incorporating social concerns 
which have received limited attention in previous literature on the sharing economy. Compared to prior 
studies considering perceived risks which could directly damage consumers only, this study adds the 
dimension of social justice, which reflects consumers’ concerns about proper functioning of sharing 
economy services in society. This paper also contributes to the literature of the sharing economy. I 
classified both consumers’ and non-consumers’ salient perceived risks in the sharing economy, 
manifesting the framework for studying platform evolution presented by Tiwana et al. (2010). 
The CE results suggest several practical implications beyond one type of service or city. To continuously 
expand their market segments, sharing economy companies need to understand how both consumers and 
non-consumers regard service providers’ working conditions, a certificate proving their skills based on an 
existing system, and comprehensive compensation for negative uncertainties as important factors when 
choosing a service. Policy makers should monitor companies to prevent misuse of consumers’ private 
information because many respondents show low concerns about downloading apps and entering their 
private information to the apps. To decrease perceived risks, policy makers can also draft legislation to 
induce this innovative service sector to reduce uncertainties when launching the service. 
This study proposes the CE as a methodological tool to assess service feature values of other sharing 
economy services. Researchers can categorize consumers and non-consumers’ concerns into four types of 
perceived risks in the sharing economy. After identifying major service features which can influence 
sharing service-acceptance processes by reducing perceived risks, researchers can construct the CE to 
present a new perspective on platform-centric ecosystems. Researchers can also consider a separated 
(adaptive) dual response method for WTP estimation when designing choice sets (Schlereth and Skiera, 
2016). Given the fast growth of the sharing economy, future studies exploring new emerging issues of 
perceived risks and alternative experimental designs of the CE would be welcome. 
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